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POLITICAL SPEAKERS AT STATE 
UNIVERSITIES: SOME CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
WILLIAM w. vAN ALSTYNE t 
[Vol.lll 
Ten years ago, the New York Times, in a survey of political 
censorship on major university campuses, concluded that: "a subtle, 
creeping paralysis of freedom of thought and speech is attacking col-
lege campuses . . · . limiting both students and faculty in the area 
traditionally reserved for the free exploration of knowledge and 
truth." 1 Events of the intervening decade have not altered the truth 
of this observation. Campus censorship in 1962 easily rivaled that 
of any previous year. From coast to coast, and particularly in the 
Midwest, student bodies were quarantined from a variety of political 
heresies.2 With certain notable exceptions,3 the prevailing university 
philosophy rejects the notion that "the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market 
• • • • " 
4 Many university officials seem to believe that they are ob-
liged, by the responsibility of their offices, to insulate their impression-
able wards from error by restricting what they shall hear. 
The controversy with which this Article deals does not revolve 
about the college classroom, but the university auditorium, amphi-
theatre, or student union-campus places traditionally thought to be 
proper forums for discussion of heterodox ideas and political issues. 
This dichotomy is important. It clearly distinguishes the legitimate 
right of administrators to select their faculties by their own standards 
from the questionable attempt to apply the same criteria in the choice 
of casual guest speakers. Universities must of necessity have the right 
to pass upon the credentials of their teaching staffs. Students enroll 
t Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University. B.A. 1955, University of 
Southern California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University. Member, California Bar. 
1 N.Y. Times, May 10, 1951, p. 1, col. 2. See also N.Y. Times, May 11, 1951, 
p. 29, col. 8; id., p. 26, col. 3. An unpublished study by the Director of the Insti-
tute of Public Affairs of the State University of Iowa in September, 1950, indicated 
that 175 publicly supported institutions--42.36% of all colleges responding to the 
survey-did not allow use of their facilities by political speakers. 
2 See N.Y. CouNTY LAwYERs Ass'N CoMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPoRT ON 
CAMPUS CENSORSHIP (1962) ; N.Y. Times, May 28, 1962, p. 31, col. 8. 
a Self-acknowledged, active officials of the Communist party were allowed to 
speak at the Universities of Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 
4Abrams v. Uni_ted States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919). 
(328) 
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in particular courses because the university tacitly guarantees that the 
professor possesses the necessary educational background and intel-
lectual objectivity to qualify as an expert in his assigned field. In 
addition, by accepting tuition, public institutions impliedly warrant 
that their teaching staffs are qualified, and will offer a reasonable 
program of instruction in return. Moreover, attendance in many 
classes is compulsory. Since students may be compelled at least to 
listen to an instructor's views, the university must assure the student 
that the ideas presented are those of a responsible academician. 
Finally, professors award grades which may be relied upon by third 
parties. If grades are to reflect fairly the student's mastery of a sub-
ject, they must be given by a person who is qualified, in the opinion 
of the university's trustees, to judge the student's competence 
impartially. 5 
The justifications for careful screening in the appointment of 
professors are inapplicable, however, to the selection of guest speakers. 
Guests who are invited by student groups to speak in available audi-
toriums or halls do not have the university's imprimatur as experts. 
The university does not charge admission to the address in exchange 
for a guarantee of the speaker's qualifications or honesty. Neither 
does the school require student attendance, nor does it encourage ac-
ceptance of the speaker's views by awarding grades. Least of all does 
the university endorse the speaker's viewpoint. The trustees and ad-
ministration no more approve the speaker's ideas than does a city 
council which allows speakers to use city parks. Furthermore, the 
audience for the guest speaker is not captive. Dissatisfied students are 
free to stay away, to barb the speaker with questions, and to invite 
guests of their own with an opposing viewpoint. So long as facilities 
are not overtaxed by excessive use, and the fundamental curriculum is 
not upset by endless distractions-conditions not yet reached on any 
American campus-universities render their best service by not inter-
fering with student access to controversial ideas. 
The fact remains, however, that a considerable number of guest 
lecturers, formally invited to state university campuses by recognized 
student organizations, have been turned away by members of the 
administration. It is significant that those to whom the students were 
forbidden to listen were very often unpopular figures. Judicially 
enforceable freedom of speech is practically unnecessary for those 
5 These arguments do not, however, justify loyalty oaths or other administrative 
attempts to stamp a faculty with political orthodoxy. Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). On the problem of subversive activities by university 
faculty members, see generally EMERSON & HABER, PoLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1070-1117 (1958). 
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espousing the prevailing view; the crucial test comes only when the 
political deviant is involved. "You really believe in freedom of speech 
if you are willing to allow it to men whose opinions seem to you 
wrong and even dangerous. . . . " 6 In this critical sense, many insti-
tutions of higher learning have not permitted real freedom of speech 
on their campuses. 
Certain organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) 7 and the National Students Association (NSA),8 
have strenuously objected to this state of affairs. The ACLU, with 
substantial support from the American Association of University Pro-
fessors (AAUP),9 has insisted that recognized student organizations 
should be permitted, when facilities are available, to extend an invita-
tion to any guest speaker. "Students should enjoy the same right as 
other citizens to hear different points of view and draw their own 
conclusions." 10 Just as the mayor or police cannot prevent a group 
of citizens from inviting a speaker lawfully to address them in a mu-
nicipal park, even though those officials view the lecturer as un-
qualified or subversive/1 university officials should not be allowed to 
interfere with similar student organization decisions. 
The County Bar Association of New York has recommended 
essentially just such a student perogative.12 Referring to a speech by 
an acknowledged Communist invited by a recognized student organiza-
tion, President Wilson of the University of Minnesota eloquently 
stated the case for student freedom: 
We believe it would be a disservice to our students and an 
insult to our nation's maturity if we were to deny Mr. Davis 
an opportunity to speak. Over-protected students might at 
once assume that Davis had something to say which was too 
strong for our reason and our convictions. The University 
is the product of a free society. It is neither afraid of free-
dom, nor can it serve society well if it casts doubts on the 
6 Rex v. Secretary of State ex parte O'Brien, [1923} 2 K.B. 361, 382 (Lord 
Justice Scrutton); see Gitlow v. New York, 234 N.Y. 132, 158 (dissenting opinion), 
aff'd, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
7 See ACLU, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STUDENTS IN CoLLEGEs 
AND UNIVERSITIES 7 (Nov. 1961). 
8 See NSA CoDIFICATION OF PoLICY 28 (1961-62). 
1l The Association has stated that it is "in general agreement with a number 
of the positions" in the ACLU pamphlet, supra note 7. 48 AAUP BULL. 110 (1962). 
10 ACLU, op. cit. supra note 7, at 7. 
11 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Rockwell v. Morris, 211 N.Y.S.Zd 
25 (Sup. Ct. 1960), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.Zd 791, 175 N.RZd 162, 215 N.Y.S.Zd 
502 (1961). See generally CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 409-31 
(1941). 
12 See N.Y. CouNTY LAWYERS Ass'N, op. cit. supra note 2, at 5. 
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ability of our free institutions to meet the challenge of doc-
trines foreign to our own.13 
331 
The arguments of the AAUP and NSA in favor of campus free-
dom of speech have been based essentially on policy grounds. The 
Constitution, however, does not guarantee the most enlightened poli-
cies; 14 it requires only that governmental action be fundamentally 
fair.15 A recent statement of the American Bar Association's Com-
mittee on the Bill of Rights, however, is particularly significant because 
it emanates from an organization professing constitutional expertise. 
The ABA Committee is of the opinion that "no question of the Bill 
of Rights is involved" where university officials decide that spokesmen 
for the Communist party shall be denied access to university facilities 
ordinarily available for guest speakers.16 The Committee report is 
expressly limited to Communists; the text indicates that the same im-
munity would not necessarily exist when other prospective speakers 
are involved. Indirectly, the arguments of the AAUP and NSA ap-
pear to concede as much, for they have been based essentially on 
appeals for an enlightened policy rather than on appeals to the Con-
stitution. In a larger sense, however, much of what is urged by these 
organizations is in fact fully supported by constitutional mandates and 
is not dependent upon securing the enthusiasm of university trustees 
or state legislatures. 
It is the thesis of this Article that the ABA Committee's position 
with regard to Communist speakers is wrong. Settled principles of 
constitutional law require a liberality in state university rules dealing 
with guest speakers far beyond what that Committee suggests or 
what currently prevails on many campuses. 
I. SuPREME CouRT STANDARDS AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 
PROBLEM 17 
The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . . " This 
13 University of Minnesota Alumni News, Jnne, 1962, p. 20. The AAUP con-
ferred the 1961 Alexander Meiklejohn Award on President Flemming of the Uni-
versity of Oregon for similar action and an equally vigorous statement. See 48 
AAUP BULL. 177 (1962). 
14 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Rostow, Japanese-America~~ Cases-A Disaster, 
54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). 
15 The Supreme Court has often equated due process with fundamental fairness. 
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 219, 325 (1937) ; Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 
312, 316 (1926); Holden v. HarCiy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898). 
16 N.Y. Times, July 22, 1962, p. 49, col. 2. 
17 I do not intend to discuss speeches of a nonpolitical nature. Such speeches, 
involving obscenity, group libel, and fighting words, are not part of the present uni-
versity problem. 
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constitutional prohibition has been incorporated into the fourteenth 
amendment so as to apply also to the states as an aspect of substantive 
due process.18 The amendment must, therefore, be obeyed by state 
universities, because they are state agencies and responsible as such.19 
It is therefore necessary to determine what restrictions on guest 
speakers imposed by state universities constitute an "abridgement." 
The critical word, "abridgement", has not, of course, been given its 
literal dictionary definition-reducing or diminishing even slightly 20-
nor could it be, consistent with maintenance of order and protection of 
life. In fact, the first amendment has come to mean both more and less 
than its language literally suggests. Some forms of non-oral ex-
pression are protected although, strictly speaking, they are not "speech" 
or "assembly"; conversely, a great deal of emotionally inciting speech 
may be restricted.21 In some circumstances, oral expression may be 
functionally identical with physical acts which, because they precipitate 
immediate violence, are clearly punishable. A favorite illustration is 
the case of an individual who falsely shouts "fire" in a crowded 
theater.22 The result is no less pernicious than the panic the shouter 
would have produced had he kindled a smoke bomb in the theater. It 
is perfectly clear that the shouter may be criminally punished, notwith-
standing that the threat of severe punishment may be viewed as deter-
ring "speech." 23 The point need not be belabored-not all abridge-
ments of speech are unconstitutional under the first amendment.24 
18 Whi1ney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
19 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954) ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) ; Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 
(1938); see also Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). All of these cases arose 
under the equal protection clause. There is no reason, however, to distinguish between 
that clause and due process, since both require state action. One court, in dictum, 
has suggested that the fourteenth amendment may also be applicable to so-called 
private universities. See Guillory v. Tulane University, 203 F. Supp. 855, 858 (E.D. 
La. 1962). 
201 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 7 (2d ed. 1956). 
21 Picketing and parades are protected under certain circumstances. Group and 
criminal libel and fighting words are not. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 
250 (1952). 
22 The illustration is that of Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also MEIKLEJOHN, PoLITICAL FREEDoM 39-43 (1960); 
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 15, 129-30 (1941). 
23 Courts are reluctant to find sufficient danger to justify suppression in anticipa-
tion of delivery of a speech. See, e.g., Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) ; Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). They will, however, sustain post-utterance punish-
ment under similar circumstances. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
24 I do not mean to take issue with those who have argued that the first amend-
ment is absolute, at least with respect to certain subjects. See Meiklejohn, The 
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuPREME CoURT REVIEW 245; Frantz, The 
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962). I have tried only to 
describe the current state of the law. However, the absolutists may be vulnerable 
on historical grounds. See LEVY, LEGACY OF SuPPRESSION (1960). They, like Mr. 
Justice Black, have done a good deal of "balancing'' in defining beforehand what is 
absolutely protected. 
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Rarely do speeches by university guest lecturers, however, sufficiently 
resemble the "fire" case to justify suppression on that ground. 
Traditionally, the standard applied by the Supreme Court in judg-
ing the constitutionality of restraints on speech has taken the following 
form: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used 
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear 
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
[the legislature] has a right to prevent." 25 Recently, the Court modi-
fied the clear and present danger test in this respect: "In each case 
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to 
avoid the danger." 26 By substituting probability of grave evil for clear 
and present danger, the Court has partially eliminated the requirement 
that the state prove the danger imminent. If a grave substantive evil 
is likely to result from a speech, the speaker may be restrained even 
though the evil will occur tomorrow rather than today.27 Moreover, 
the necessary quantum of danger varies inversely with the gravity of 
the evil. With certain minor embellishments,28 this accurately describes 
the present test applied by the Court. 
Universities have experienced difficulty with both parts of the test. 
They have improperly identified the kinds of evils that are constitu-
tionally within their power to prevent, and have failed to develop con-
clusive standards by which to isolate speakers whose presence on cam-
pus will probably incite violence. 
Maximally, the evils which justify restraints of speech are co-
terminous with substantive legislative power.29 A state, for example, 
25 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ; accord, Herndon v. Lowry, 
301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; Stromberg v. 
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
26 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (quoting Judge Hand in 
the lower court, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) ). In certain instances of statutory 
construction, the test in the Dennis case has been made more stringent. See Yates v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810 (9th 
Cir. 1961). 
27 The change introduced by the Dennis rule tends to place emphasis on silence 
as the means of avoiding substantive evils rather than on countervailing discussion. 
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring); 
Frantz, The First Ame11dment i1~ the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1428 (1962). 
28 It has been argued that even the Dennis test does not apply when the re-
pressive effect of legislation restricting speech is incidental to the primary purpose 
of the legislature. See Frantz, supra note 27, at 1428-30. The cases cited by Frantz, 
however, would not affect the application of the Dennis test to university guest 
speakers. See Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
167 (1961). 
29 The word maximally is used advisedly. Justice Brandeis wrote, in Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) : 
[E]ven imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these func-
tions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is rela-
tively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so 
stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a rela-
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clearly can punish persons who assault the governor or who sabotage 
city hall. Speech which would make such action highly probable may, 
therefore, also be punished. On the other hand, the state cannot pun-
ish those who vote against the governor, or who vote to sell the city hall 
at public auction. It would accordingly be unconstitutional for the 
legislature to prescribe punishment for those who advocate, urge, or 
incite the public to vote in such a fashion, no matter how great the 
probability that, as a result, the governor will lose the next election or 
city hall will be sold. No matter how strongly the legislature detests 
these prospects or suspects the motives of their advocates, it cannot 
constitutionally prevent their advocacy. 
Although the distinction is obvious, it is pathetically ignored. 
Many of those prevented from speaking on state university campuses 
would have advocated lawful conduct only. They would have encour-
aged acts which, no matter how disagreeable or evil to the university 
administration, could not legally be proscribed.30 Repeal of the McCar-
ran Act or disbanding of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities by vote of Congress could not be punished. Speeches which 
urge their elimination by any and all constitutional means are, there-
fore, equally inviolate. The same is true of talks urging recognition of 
Communist China, impeachment of the Chief Justice, cessation of 
nuclear testing by executive order, or desegregation by legislative ac-
tion. Since the type of action urged is not censurable, neither can the 
prevailing majority, in order to insulate itself from change, censor 
speech designed to bring about such action. With regard to the com-
monplace ban against Communists, supported by the Bar Association 
Committee, even expression designed to produce a communist state is 
protected if the means being advocated are themselves lawful. 
The American Bar Association Committee might, of course, point 
to the congressional finding, accepted by the Supreme Court,31 that the 
tively trivial harm to society. • . . Thus, a State might, in the exercise of 
its police power, make any trespass upon the land of another a crime, 
regardless of the results or of the intent or purpose of the trespasser. It 
might, also, punish an attempt, a conspiracy, or an incitement to commit the 
trespass. But it is hardly conceivable that this Court would hold constitu-
tional a statute which punished as a felony the mere voluntary assembly 
with a society formed to teach that pedestrians had the moral right to cross 
unenclosed, unposted, waste lands and to advocate their doing so, even if 
there was imminent danger that advocacy would lead to a trespass. The 
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of 
property is not enough to justify its suppression. 
See generally, CHAFEE, THE BLESS!NGS OF LIBERTY 102-16 (1956) ; MEIKLEJOHN, 
PoLITICAL FREEDOM 45-50 (1960). But see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 
336 u.s. 490 (1949). 
30 See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 
(1937) (dictum). The Fiske case is discussed in CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE 
UNITED STATES 351-52 (1941). 
31 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) ; Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
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world Communist movement intends to overthrow our government un-
lawfully-by force and violence. If this were actually attempted, it 
would clearly be punishable. Speeches, therefore, which are likely to 
incite violent revolution may also be punished or restrained.32 
What this point of view overlooks, however, is that not all action 
urged by Communists can be punished.33 Communists on occasion 
advocate legislative nationalization of industry, or executive recogni-
tion of Communist China. Speeches urging these objectives cannot be 
prevented merely because they are delivered by individuals who also 
harbor the view-but not then expressed-that violent revolution is 
desirable. A flat ban on Communist speakers is constitutionally defec-
tive precisely because it is unlimited. It fails to distinguish between 
the kinds of substantive change advocated. A ban directed at the 
speaker rather than at the course of conduct urged on a particular 
occasion goes too far. It ignores not only the nature of the action to 
be urged, but also the "probability'' requirement of the Supreme Court 
test. Even if a proposed speech would urge unlawful action, circum-
stances may be such that the audience is highly unlikely to respond 
favorably. A remote tendency to incite unlawful action is not enough 
to justify suppression.34 To illustrate the foregoing proposition, sup-
pose a recognized student group were to invite the Soviet Ambassador 
to address them on "The Meaning of the Treaty of Antarctica in 
Soviet-American Relations." Unless it could be demonstrated that the 
Ambassador would depart from the chosen subject to move his audience 
to unlawful action, which is highly unlikely, a state university could not 
bar him from its campus consistently with any current interpretation 
of the fourteenth amendment. We may assume that the Ambassador 
is a member of the Communist Party and an agent of a hostile foreign 
power. Among his other views, he may favor violent overthrow of 
our government. He may not be barred on this occasion, however, 
because the particular speech he proposes to make will not incite vio-
lence. For this very reason, the Supreme Court of California invali-
dated a state law which banned "subversive elements" from public 
school auditoriums.35 The California court quoted the United States 
Supreme Court in Del onge v. Oregon: 36 
32 Scales v. United States, supra note 31; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951). 
33 See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286-88 (1961); 
Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961); note 30 supra. 
34 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). See also Rockwell v. 
Morris, 211 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1960), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 
162, 215 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1961). 
35 Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 
(1946). See also ACLU v. Board of Educ., 359 P.Zd 45, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Sup. 
Ct. 1961). 
36299 u.s. 353 (1937). 
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The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable 
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under 
which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to 
the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances 
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the 
Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have com-
mitted crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged 
in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may 
be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid 
laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of 
prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere par-
ticipation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public dis-
cussion as the basis for a criminal charge.37 
Thus it is clear that the decision to bar a prospective guest speaker 
from campus must be based on the text of the proposed speech and 
its probable effect, rather than on the affiliation of the speaker.88 To 
the extent that the ABA Committee Report adopts a contrary position, 
it is in error. 
There is one other aspect of the problem which should be noted 
before returning to the broader questions. A number of universities 
may have banned controversial speakers without any apprehension that 
those favorable to the speaker would riot in support of the ideas urged. 
Instead, they may have feared that those opposed to the speaker would 
precipitate violence. Superficially, this reactive form of violence seems 
equally to justify suppression, inasmuch as there would be a substan-
tial probability of physical disorder. "[I] t is not a constitutional prin-
ciple that, in acting to preserve order, the police must proceed against 
the crowd, whatever its size and temper, and not against the speaker." 39 
But this proposition is valid only to a very limited extent. Unless 
the exception is extremely limited, it will invite those who would 
suppress free speech to manufacture the evil needed to justify official 
restraint. For this reason, the threat of disorder in opposition to the 
speaker must clearly "rise far above public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or unrest," 40 for "constitutional rights . . are not to be sacrificed or 
yielded to . . . violence and disorder . . . . " 41 In the area of 
37 I d. at 365-"06. 
38 See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Danskin v. 
San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946) ; Buckley v. 
Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also Buckley v. Meng, 224 N.Y.S.2d 
136 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
39 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 289 (1951) (concurring opinion). See 
also Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568 (1942); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
834 (1957). 
40 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
41 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958). 
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segregation, also a fourteenth amendment problem, the Supreme Court 
has held that the maintenance of public tranquility must yield to the 
guarantee of equal protection.42 "[I]mportant as is the preservation 
of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordi-
nances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitu-
tion." 43 Even the narrow exception is forfeited if opposition to the 
speaker is encouraged by the inflammatory statements of state officials. 
Under such circumstances, not even a material disturbance of the 
public order will justify suppression.44 This formulation is eminently 
sensible. It is based on the proposition that those who are alarmed by 
what they believe to be false and misleading opinions should exercise 
their own freedom of speech in rebuttal; they cannot so structure the 
market place of ideas that only sentiments agreeable to them can be 
heard. 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND FREE SPEECH 
This is not to suggest that a state university must necessarily 
make its facilities available to all speakers or even to the large majority 
who would not incite unlawful action. Granting that freedom of 
speech occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of constitutional 
values,45 it does not follow that it may be exercised at any time, in 
any manner, on any state property, without regard to the primary use 
to which the property has been dedicated. The corridors of a state 
office building may be closed altogether to political speakers, lest such 
use of them effectively impair their essential function as passageways. 
Public streets have traditionally been used for parades and demonstra-
tions, but modest, nondiscriminatory licensing has been sustained to 
preserve their primary utility as thoroughfares.46 Restrictions upon 
the time, place, and manner of speaking necessarily reduce the absolute-
42 Cooper v. Aaron, supra note 41. 
43 Buchanan v. Warely, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917); cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 
U.S. 290 (1951) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Rockwell v. Morris, 211 
N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct 1960), appeal dismissed, 9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.2d 162, 215 
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1961). The same principle was involved in Schneider v. State, 308 
U.S. 147 (1939). The Court there held that the likelihood that the recipients of 
handbills would litter the streets was insufficient justification for restraining the dis-
tributor. See also Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 327 n.9 (1951) (dissenting 
opinion); Note, Free Speech and the Hostile A11dimce, 26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 489 
(1951); Note, Problem of the Hostile A11dience, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1949). 
44 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
45 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 
U.S. 102 (1943); United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.Z (1945). But see 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (concurring opinion). 
46 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 
U.S. 315 (1951) ; Clemmons v. Congress of Racial Equality, 201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. 
La. 1962). 
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ness of freedom of speech, but some accommodation of competing in-
terests which also merit protection is obviously required.47 In this 
regard, a college campus is constitutionally distinguishable from a pub-
lic park in which no form of prior restraint of political assemblies is 
sustainable.48 But in regulating the use of its facilities, a state uni-
versity may not discriminate among speakers on the bases either of 
their affiliation, or the controversial or allegedly disreputable nature 
of their opinions. The problem is, at heart, more a function of the 
equal protection clause than of substantive due process.49 
Application of these general considerations to state universities, 
however, is difficult. The federal courts have never had occasion to 
determine the proper accommodation of the competing interests in this 
particular context. What constitutes the primary function of uni-
versity facilities remains a matter of opinion. Offices and corridors, 
of course, may be closed to speakers altogether. But auditoriums, un-
used classrooms, malls, and amphitheatres are structually suited and 
largely designed for assemblies of one sort or another. Since they 
are especially suitable speaking places, a university might reasonably 
be required to open them to any person or organization when space 
is available and the applicant is willing to meet the costs generated by 
his appearance. 
Two state courts, while requiring nondiscriminatory standards 
once public school facilities had been opened to some speakers, have 
suggested that school property need not have been made available to 
outsiders in the first instance.50 A complete ban on guest speakers 
would, according to those courts, be a reasonable means of reserving 
the premises for their primary educational function. Such dicta, even 
if correct, are of limited applicability to the state university problem, 
since most of these institutions already permit at least some outside 
speakers to use their facilities. Once this is done, the equal protection 
argument, which was sustained by the two courts, governs. 
The dicta are, in any case, of questionable validity. A state is 
under no constitutional duty to establish municipal parks or other con-
venient public meeting places. But once it does, the state may not then 
47 See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Breard v. Alexandria, 
341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); People v. Nahman, 
298 N.Y. 95 (1948); EMERSON & HABER, PoLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS rN THE 
UNITED STATES 797-801 (1958). 
48 See Rockwell v. Morris, 211 N.Y.S.Zd 25 (Sup. Ct. 1960), appeal dismissed, 
9 N.Y.2d 791, 175 N.E.Zd 162, 215 N.Y.S.Zd 502 (1961) ; cf. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH 
IN THE UNITED STATES 418-30 (1941). 
49 See cases cited note 38 Sltpra. 
5o Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 933 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Danskin v. San 
Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545, 171 P.Zd 885, 891 (1946). See also 
Ellis v. Dixon, 118 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Annot., 86 A.L.R. 1175 (1933). 
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close the parks to public assembly. To paraphrase the Supreme Court, 
"the question here is not of a duty of the State to supply [speaking 
facilities], . . . but of its duty when it provides such [facilities] to 
furnish [them] to the residents of the State upon the basis of an equal-
ity of right." 51 Moreover, a definition of "primary educational pur-
pose" that excludes the use of schools by outsiders for political con-
troversy may be too parochial to have constitutional standing in a 
democratic society. 
Even if it is assumed that uninvited speakers do not conform to 
a university's primary use because they have nothing of educational 
value to say, discrimination against lecturers specifically invited by 
recognized student organizations or regular faculty members is still 
indefensible as a matter of policy, and as a matter of law as well. It 
would be extremely farfetched to assert that a university's educational 
purpose is totally circumscribed by its curriculum, so that even invited 
speakers do not contribute to its primary function. 
III. THE DocTRINE oF REAsoNABLE TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER 
Up to this point it has been assumed that the "primary purpose 
test" requires that a speaker can be barred upon a showing that his 
appearance would not affirmatively contribute to the educational goals 
of the university whose premises he uses. This formulation is, how-
ever, entirely too narrow, and tends dangerously to frustrate the protec-
tive purpose of the clear and present danger test. The mere irrelevance 
of proposed speech to the primary use of state owned property is not 
enough to justify restraint. Municipal officials cannot prevent assem-
bly in a public park because the proposed gathering will not affirma-
tively contribute to the park's primary function as a place of recreation 
or refreshment. A similar argument by a state university to excuse 
the withholding of its speaking facilities should also be rejected. The 
correct test is not whether the proposed use will affirmatively contribute 
to the primary use, but whether it will intolerably burden the school's 
facilities.52 State universities may deny guest speakers access to 
premises structurally suited for addresses in only two situations-when 
the proposed speech is likely to detract substantially from the rest of 
the educational program, or when it is not otherwise constitutionally 
51 Missouri e~ rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938) ; see Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ; Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d 150, 156 
(5th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.Zd 719, 
722 (D.C. 'cir. 1961); Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. Zd 1, 16-17, 260 
P.Zd 668, 677 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Miller, An Affirmative 
Thmst to Due Process of Law, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 399 (1962). 
52 See note 43 supra. 
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protected because of the evil it will probably produce.53 Furthermore, 
the interference with the educational program must be direct, fully 
equivalent to the disruption of traffic caused by a parade. It is not 
enough that some offended taxpayers or legislators may retroactively 
"harm" the university because it has loaned its premises to an "un-
desirable" speaker. Such a situation is indistinguishable from that of 
a school board which must desegregate even in the face of legislative 
threats of punitive measures. 
The correct standard, therefore, must take into consideration the 
reasonableness of the time, place, and manner of the proposed speech. 
A university may properly subordinate requests for the use of its fa-
cilities by guest speakers to all of its regularly scheduled activities. 
Reasonable men may differ as to whether a particular address will ac-
tually contribute more to the educational program than would a con-
flicting university-sponsored activity. Courts, however, are extremely 
unlikely to second-guess this aspect of administrative discretion; 54 a 
showing of good faith is the most that would be required. In addition, 
a rule limiting the use of college premises to speakers invited by recog-
nized student organizations, faculty members, or administrative per-
sonnel may be valid as a reasonable precaution against frivolous outside 
use.55 It is doubtless true that certain unsponsored uses have as much 
educative value as a sponsored lecture. But regard for administrative 
difficulties in making ad hoc judgments of this kind, however, may 
justify the broader rule as a reasonable regulation. Of course, student 
and faculty invitations themselves may be disapproved by the university 
administration-even though the proposed speech would not incite 
unlawful action-if there is substantial reason to believe that the 
proposed assembly will materially disrupt the regular educational 
program. 
This final principle may appear to grant the university part of the 
same authority claimed for it by the American Bar Association Com-
mittee Report. An administrator might, for example, cancel an in-
vitation to a Communist, not on the basis of his affiliation or opinion, 
but because the speaker's presence would disrupt the regular educa-
53 See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 
54 In various circumstances, courts have deferred to discretionary decisions made 
by university administrators. See Webb v. State Univ. of New York, 125 F. Supp. 
910 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 867 (1954); Pyeatte v. Board of 
Regents, 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla. 1951), af/'d, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); cf. 
Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) ; Bluett v. Board of 
Trustees, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E2d 635 (1956); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 
130 Misc. 249, 223 N.Y. Supp. 796 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. 
Supp. 435 (1928). 
55 See note SO supra and accompanying text. This would only be true, however, 
if the university did not discriminate in recognizing student groups. 
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tional program. If the university unarbitrarily applied clear and 
specific rules, and if there was substantial evidence to support the 
decision, the result might indeed be the same as under the Bar Asso-
ciation opinion. But the very qualifications listed show that the two 
approaches are fundamentally different. Moreover, as the decision 
may constitute a prior restraint, it will be subject to "more exacting 
judicial scrutiny" than virtually any other problem of constitutional 
law.56 The standard applied must not be "so vague as to invite dis-
crimination" or so broad as to rest on the "untrammelled discretion" of 
the decision maker.57 Finally, even if the university's rules are carefully 
drawn, the particular decision will be invalid unless consistent with 
previous university conduct.58 
The disruptions which justify restrictions on guest speakers are 
extremely limited. Outside community harassment or the known pro-
pensity of taxpayers to retaliate through the ballot are insufficient; 
othenvise, no public forum for the exchange of ideas would long remain 
open to any political minority. Rather, the disruption must physically 
interfere with the regular college program. Some examples are a 
speech so scheduled as to encourage students to be absent from class in 
substantial numbers; one which would compete with a regularly sched-
uled university function being held on another part of campus ; or an 
assembly conducted in so raucous a manner as to disturb library, 
office, or classroom work. However, modest inconveniences of the 
56 United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also 
cases cited note 45 supra; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; Freund, The 
Stepreme Court am:l Civil Liberties, 4 V AND. L. REv. 533 (1951) ; McKay, The 
Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959); Note, Prior Restraint, 
49 CoLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1949). 
57 Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 928 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) ; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) ; Cantwell 
v. Counecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Very 
often, the doctrine of constitutional vagueness turns on the lack of adequate notice as 
to what is forbidden. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Because a speaker, in applying for 
a permit, is advised in advance of what is proscribed, the absence of notice as an 
element of vagueness may be missing and the doctrine therefore inapplicable. See 
Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 
77, 79 (1948). But see A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 
239 (1925); Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962). 
Nevertheless, there are at least three objections to vagueness of rules for licensing 
of political discussion. (1) It inadvertently encourages arbitrary decisions by the 
administrator who lacks sufficient standards to guide his judgment. This may result 
in an unreasonable burden on applicants to seek judicial clarification. (2) It pro-
vides inadequate standards for court review of administrators' decisions. See Watkins 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 204-05 (1957). (3) The apparent breadth of the 
licensing rules may discourage the exercise of rights which may be constitutionally 
protected. The applicant may choose to forego his rights rather than submit to the 
expense and burden of litigation. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) ; 
Collings, Unconstitutioual Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197 
(1955); 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1962). 
58 See Buckley v. Meng, supra note 57. 
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latter type are insufficient justification for disapproval of a speaker. 
A useful analogy may be made to assemblies or peaceful picketing on 
public walks which may not be restrained unless traffic will be substan-
tially impeded. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
Universities would render a far greater service by abandoning 
substantive limitations on guest speakers altogether. Any other 
policy necessarily expresses a skepticism of student intelligence and 
fear of the appeal of today's social critics. Both inferences are contrary 
to the categorical imperatives of a free society. All that ought to be 
required of any student organization or faculty member wishing to 
invite a guest speaker should be adequate notice of the time and place 
of the proposed address, so as to make certain that speaking facilities 
will be physically available and that the event will not cause undue 
congestion. 
Even though some may find these propositions unacceptable as 
a matter of policy, it remains true that the power to impose more 
stringent conditions is sharply circumscribed by the requirements of the 
Constitution. With respect to speeches of a political character and 
speakers invited by members of a university community, the Constitu-
tion permits a state to ban only those who would exhort their audience 
to unlawful action, it being reasonably clear that they would succeed 
in their attempt if allowed to appear. Although a state university 
may also require that speeches be scheduled for a reasonable time and 
place and be conducted in a peaceful manner, so as not to disrupt other 
university activities, surely only a few invitations will be disqualified 
on this basis. Here, as in matters of race relations and religious 
toleration, the Constitution may exact a greater measure of generosity 
than would otherwise be acknowledged; it is probably well that it does. 
